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Frye after Daubert: The Role of Scientists in
Admissibility Issues As Seen through
Analysis of the DNA Profiling Cases
Lawrence B. Ebert'
In Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Su-
preme Court held that the Frye rule for admissibility of scientific
evidence had been superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and thus that "general acceptance" within the
appropriate scientific community is not a necessary precondition
for admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts.' Al-
though the Federal Rules of Evidence have been adopted either
wholly or substantially by over 30 states,2 several state court
decisions have suggested that Daubert will not be dispositive in
their handling of scientific admissibility issues.' Because the
Frye standard can still be employed at the state court level4, and
because "general acceptance" is one among several factors a trial
judge may consider in determining admissibility under Daubert,5
the issue of the role of scientists in analyzing the admissibility of
scientific evidence remains an important one. Furthermore, in
the history of cases on the admissibility of DNA profiling evi-
dence, one sees a model for cooperative interaction between the
scientific and legal communities to properly handle admission of
I B.S. 1971, The University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1975, Stanford University; J.D. 1993,
The University of Chicago. The author is currently an associate with Pennie & Edmonds
in New York.
' Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S Ct 2786, 2793, 2797 (1993);
Frye v United States, 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923).
2 Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence v (West, 2d ed 1987).
' Arizona v Bible, 858 P2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz 1993); People v Wash, 24 Cal Rptr 2d
421, 437 n 9 (Cal 1993), 861 P2d 1107; Flanagan v Florida, 625 So2d 827, 829 n 2 (Fla
1993); Illinois v Mehlberg, 618 NE2d 1168, 1993 Il App LEXIS 1201, *71 n 1 (III App);
Minnesota v Alt, 504 NW2d 38, 1993 Minn App LEXIS 757, *21 (Minn App 1993); New
Hampshire v Cressey, 628 A2d 696, 1993 N.H. LEXIS 83, *5 (NH 1993); New York v
Moore, 1993 WL 511845 (AD2d); Washington v Jones, 1993 WL 497403, *15 n 10 (Wash
App).
SMichael Hoenig, The New Reliability Test for Expert Testimony, NY L J 3 (Jul 12,
1993).
' Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2797.
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novel scientific evidence.
DNA profiling was first proposed as a scientific method for
individuation in 1985.6 Within three years, a state appellate
court had upheld the validity of DNA profiling for purposes of
inculpation of a criminal defendant v This rapid acceptance of a
novel scientific method for inclusive individuation was unprece-
dented. In the case of analysis by blood typing, there had been a
long period during which evidence was admissible for exculpation
(exclusion) but not for inculpation (inclusion).8 In DNA profiling,
the sequence was reversed, with much initial focus on
inculpation, and little discussion of its power for exculpation.'
The blitzkrieg entrance of DNA profiling into the legal
system was assisted by a general societal belief in the "can do"
powers of biotechnology, probably not unlike beliefs held about
atomic energy in the 1950's. More directly, the entrance into the
legal system was facilitated by claims of enormous probabilities
of individuation in situations in which a match was declared; in
the extreme case, odds of 738 quadrillion to 1 against misidentifi-
cation were declared." Because of its power of individuation,
DNA profiling is the single most powerful forensic tool of the
1990s.
Since 1988, the majority of courts have found DNA profiling
6 Alec J. Jeffreys, Victoria Wilson and Swee Lay Thein, Hypervariable 'Minisatellite'
Regions in Human DNA, 314 Nature 67 (Mar 7, 1985): [DNA 'fingerprintsl provide a
powerful method for paternity and maternity testing, [and] can be used in forensic appli-
cations. .. ."
Andrews v State, 533 So2d 841 (Fla Dist Ct App 1988).
Lilly, Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 502-03 (cited in note 2). Michael 0.
Finkelstein, Statistics for Lawyers 99 (Springer, 1990).
' Although most of the publicity surrounding DNA profiling has arisen over the
possibility of false positives in the inculpation (inclusion) of criminal defendants, the test
may also be used for purposes of exculpation (exclusion) of criminal defendants or in-
mates. Kenneth W. Nimmich, chief of the Scientific Analysis Section at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's laboratory in Washington said that about 30% of the DNA tests
that they conduct show no match. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rape Conviction Overturned on
DNA Tests, NY Times B6 (Dec 2, 1992). On December 1, 1992, the conviction for rape of
Terry Kotler was overturned on the basis of exclusionary DNA evidence; Mr. Kotler had
served 11 years in prison. Within one week of the release, the victim still maintained Mr.
Kotler's guilt. Id. In fact, three DNA tests showed Kotler did not commit the rape, but the
first two were kept out of court by prosecutors. Robert Davis, Fighting Crime, and Convic-
tions, with DNA Genetic Testing on Rise, USA Today A8 (Jan 4, 1993). A December 21,
1992 Pennsylvania Superior Court decision held that anyone accused of rape has the right
to DNA tests. Biotechnology Newswatch 4 (Jan 4, 1993). DNA profiling already has its
analogue of the classic blood test exclusion/conviction [Berry v Chaplin, 169 P2d 442 (Cal
App 1946)], in which a man excluded by DNA profiling was convicted anyway. Jack
Ewing, Connecticut Jury Disregards DNA Test, Natl L J 9 (Apr 23, 1990).
10 Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 Nature 501 (1989).
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evidence to be admissible." Before Daubert, profiling evidence
was admitted for purposes of inculpation in jurisdictions using
permissive Federal Rules of Evidence standards.' Therein,
evidence helpful to the jury is admitted as long as its probative
value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, coiffusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or undue
delay.3 Other courts admitted DNA profiling evidence under the
more restrictive Frye or modified Frye standards. The Frye
standard requires general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community of both the theory and the technique underlying the
scientific test.'4 Some jurisdictions add a third prong to Frye,
requiring that the testing laboratory perform the correct scientific
procedures in the particular case. 5
Resistance to the admissibility of DNA profiling later devel-
oped in Frye or modified Frye jurisdictions. 6 The resistance first
formed around issues about the quality of experiments performed
in individual laboratories and extended to certain assumptions
within the theory that were used in the calculation of probabili-
ties.' By placing the decision-making burden on the relevant
As of October, 1991, thirteen state supreme courts had ruled on admissibility of
DNA profiling, eight rulings were favorable, three were inconclusive, and two were
somewhat negative. Nancy Montgomery, Russel Murder Trial Sets a Precedent with Use of
DNA Test, Seattle Times El (Oct 14, 1991). The Supreme Court of Hawaii noted that as
of March 27,1992, of 38 reported DNA decisions, only six have found profiling evidence inad-
missible. State v Montalbo, 828 P2d 1274, 1283 n 7 (Hawaii 1992).
12 United States v Jakobetz, 747 F Supp 250 (D Vt 1990), afid 955 F2d 786 (2d Cir),
cert denied 113 S Ct 104 (1992). The district court admitted DNA profile evidence under
the Federal Rules of Evidence standard, and the Second Circuit affirmed and indicated
that the Frye standard would also be satisfied. See also State v Brown, 470 NW2d 30
(Iowa 1991) (court applied state rules of evidence standards to admit DNA profiling).
'3 FRE 403.
14 Frye v United States, 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923).
15 California uses the Kelly/Frye test in which "the proponent of the evidence must
demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case." People v
Kelly, 17 Cal 3d 24, 30, 549 P2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal Rptr 144, 148 (Cal 1976). In the spe-
cific context of DNA profiling, a third prong to Frye, involving lab procedure, was added in
People v Castro, 144 Misc 2d 965, 545 NYS2d 985 (Super Ct 1989).
" The pivotal case questioning the accuracy of laboratory results of DNA profiling is
Castro, 545 NYS2d at 985.
" State v Schwartz, 447 NW2d 422 (Minn 1989); both Frye and the Federal Rules of
Evidence were used to exclude DNA evidence in Commonwealth v Curnin, 409 Mass 218,
565 NE2d 440 (Mass 1991). The epic battle was United States v Yee, 134 FRD 161 (N D
Ohio 1991), affid 1993 US App LEXIS 32574 (6th Cir). Although the DNA evidence was
admitted, the opponents published their arguments in 254 Science 1745 (1991), which was
extensively quoted in United States v Porter, 618 A2d 629 (DC 1992). Using the Kelly/Frye
standard, California admitted DNA profiling evidence for inculpation in People v Axell,
235 Cal App 3d 836, 1 Cal Rptr 411 (1991). However, after the Lewontin/Hartl paper and
the NRC report on DNA profiling, see note 18 and accompanying text, California refused
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scientific community with regard to questions of admissibility of
scientific theories or techniques, the Frye standard creates a
restoring force through which the legal system is pointed in the
direction of the proper scientific result. In the context of DNA
profiling, this restoring force was manifested in the publication
entitled "DNA Technology in Forensic Science" by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. 8 Al-
though the results of this report are not accepted by all sides,'9
the report establishes a set of minimum standards under which
criminal defendants may be judged in the period during which
significant scientific agreement does not exist. Under Frye, this
report serves as a readily obtainable measure of the scientific
consensus on DNA profiling. Thus, a compromise is obtained
between the prosecutor who needs the valuable scientific tool and
the defendant who might be unfairly prejudiced by hyperbolic
claims of accuracy.
This comment argues that the acceptance of a relevant
scientific community should be a "necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence."2 The Frye standard, in
explicitly requiring general acceptance in the appropriate scien-
tific community of both the theory and technique, is superior to
the more general, multi-factored Federal Rules of Evidence
standards, including the one espoused in Daubert. Moreover,
novel scientific evidence should not be admitted unless the meth-
ods actually employed by the specific laboratory are routinely
to admit DNA profiling evidence for inculpation in People v Barney, 8 Cal App 4th 798,
825, 10 Cal Rptr 2d 731 (1992); People v Howard, 8 Cal App 4th 798, 10 Cal Rptr 2d 731
(1992): "We conclude the admission of the DNA analysis evidence in the present cases was
error for two reasons: (1) the absence of general scientific acceptance as to the statistical
calculation process, and (2) the lack of the third prong inquiry." See also People v Wallace,
14 Cal App 4th 651, 17 Cal Rptr 2d 721 (1993).
8 In United States v Porter, 618 A2d 629 (DC 1992), the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals admitted profiling evidence, but suggested that probabilities might be used
only to the extent that the requisite consensus existed. The court relied heavily on the re-
port of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences entitled DNA
Technology in Forensic Science, which was released in April, 1992. Committee on DNA
Technology in Forensic Inference, DNA Technology in Forensic Science (National Acad-
emy, 1992). ("the NRC report"). See also Leslie Roberts, DNA Fingerprinting: Academy
Reports, 256 Science 300 (Apr 17, 1992). On the other side of the coin stands Common.
wealth v Teixeira, in which a Superior Court Judge in Massachusetts ruled DNA evidence
admissible because of the NRC report and in spite of the holding on inadmissibility in
Commonwealth v Cumin. Dick Dahl, DNA 'Matching' Tests Admissible, Judge Rules; Neu
Statistical Technique Key to Ruling, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly 46 (Dec 7, 1992).
" B. Devlin, Neil Risch, and Kathryn Roeder, Statistical Evaluation of DNA Finger-
printing: A Critique of the NRC's Report, 259 Science 748 (1993).
20 Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2799.
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capable of giving the result of the generally accepted
technique.2 '
Therefore, this paper has two goals: first, to illustrate,
through DNA profiling, the role of the scientific community in
deciding questions of admissibility of scientific theories or tech-
niques; and second, to argue that the Frye standard, by establish-
ing general acceptance of the scientific theory or technique as an
absolute prerequisite for admissibility, is superior to the Federal
Rules standards.
This paper is divided into three parts. Part I defines the
legal standards for admitting novel scientific evidence into the
courtroom. Part II defines the components of the DNA profiling
method and identifies those areas in which conflict has devel-
oped. Part III presents arguments for the use of the Frye stan-
dard.
I. STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY: FRYE VERSUS DAUBERT
Benchmark evidentiary standards emanate from Frye and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The intrinsic distinction is that
scientists assess the validity of techniques in Frye while judges
determine the reliability of techniques in the standards based on
the Federal Rules.
A. The Frye Standard
In 1923, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that polygraph evidence could not be used to excul-
pate a defendant because no generally accepted scientific theory
supported the test.22 As a result, evidence from lie detectors was
inadmissible for purposes of both inculpation (inclusion) and
exculpation (exclusion).
The key aspects of what has become the Frye standard are
contained within a single paragraph:
21 This position is in tension with the conclusion of Comment, The Admissibility of
DNA Typing: A New Methodology, 79 Georgetown L J 313 (1990). Therein, both the Frye
test and the Federal Rules of Evidence test (termed McCormick's relevancy approach) are
rejected in favor of the Downing test, in which reliability, rather than probative value, is bal-
anced against prejudicial effect. United States v Downing, 753 F2d 1224 (3d Cir 1985).
The Downing analysis is mentioned with favor in Daubert. Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2797.
' Frye v United States, 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923), superseded by statute as stated in
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 113 S Ct 2786 (1993).
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized and while the
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field to which it belongs.'
The Frye test is considered to have two parts. First, there must
be a theory that is generally accepted in the appropriate scientif-
ic community. The general acceptance of the theory serves as a
proxy for the existence of valid scientific principles underlying
the theory. Second, there must be methods, implementing the
theory, which are generally accepted in the appropriate scientific
field. The general acceptance of methods serves as a proxy for the
existence of a valid and reliable scientific technique to utilize the
theory in practice.
The traditional arguments in favor of the Frye standard are
that it allows disputes about scientific validity to be resolved by
the pertinent scientific community, spares the courts the time-
consuming, difficult tasks of assessing scientific developments,
and protects the trier of fact from its likely predisposition to find
all scientific results to be accurate and reliable.'
As applied by many state courts, the Frye test asks two ques-
tions to establish admissibility of the evidence. According to the
Castro court, these two prongs of Frye are:25
1. Is there a theory that is generally accepted in the scientif-
ic community which supports the conclusion that the scien-
tific test can produce reliable results?
2. Are there techniques and experiments that currently exist
that are capable of producing reliable results which are
generally accepted in the scientific community?
Additionally, to deal with concerns about Frye's inadequacy with
respect to highly complex procedures, the Castro court included a
third prong which related to the experimental procedure used in
the specific case:26
Frye, 293 F at 1014.
24 Lilly, Introduction to the Law of Evidence at 495 (cited in note 2).
2 Castro, 545 NYS2d at 987-88.
26 The Castro court noted that while the first two prongs of the test represented the
[1993:
219] Frye after Daubert
3. Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific
technique?
Although this third prong has been adopted by some courts ana-
lyzing admissibility of DNA profiling,27 other courts' and some
commentators have been critical:
The Castro court's compromise is problematic, however,
because questions regarding the reliability -of particular
procedures go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the
DNA evidence. While the conflict of authority on this issue is
well-recognized, both eminent commentators and many
courts have taken the position that questions regarding
procedures go to weight, not admissibility.
29
The conventional two-prong Frye test has ambiguities:
1. What must be generally accepted, the underlying principle
or the application?
2. What is the appropriate community?
3. How much agreement constitutes general acceptance?
4. What defines the reach of Frye?
essential inquiries under Frye, the third prong constituted a separate and independent
test, warranting its own pretrial inquiry. Castro, 545 NYS2d at 988.
' United States v Two Bulls, 918 F2d 56, 61 (8th Cir 1990); Exparte Perry, 586 So2d
242, 248 (Ala 1991); Commonwealth v Rodgers, 605 A2d 1228, 1234 (Pa Super 1992);
People v Lindsey, 1993 Colo App LEXIS 2, *11-12 (Colo App 1993).
' The clearest rejection appears in State v Cauthron, 120 Wash 2d 879, 846 P2d 502,
1993 Wash LEXIS 56, *18-19: "The Castro analysis is inappropriate in jurisdictions
utilizing the Frye standard of admissibility. The core concern of Frye is only whether the
evidence being offered is based on established scientific methodology. This involves both
an accepted theory and a valid technique to implement that theory. ... If the particular
technique is sufficiently accepted in the scientific community at large, any remaining
concerns about the possibility of error or mistakes being made in the case at hand can be
argued to the factfinder." Additionally, New York courts rejected the Castro analysis in
People v Moore, 1993 WL 511845 (NYAD), People v Mohit, 153 Misc 2d 22, 579 NYS2d
990, 992 (Westchester County Ct 1992) and in People v Wesley, 589 NYS2d 197 (App Div
1992), 183 A2d 75. Arguably, State u Montalbo, 828 P2d 1274 (Hawaii 1992) holds that
challenges to test results go to weight. Two other cases suggest only that the third prong
of Castro is not part of Frye. Although applying only a two prong analysis, the court in
State v Ford, 301 SC 485, 392 SE2d 781, 784 (SC 1990), cited Castro favorably in stating
that the admissibility of DNA test results remains subject to attack. Similarly, the court
in State v Vandebogart, 136 NH 365, 616 A2d 483 (NH 1992) did not consider the third
prong of Castro part of Frye, but did acknowledge that the admissibility of test results
could be challenged.
' Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 329 (cited in note 21). Footnotes omitted.
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Although Commentators in the DNA profiling area have criti-
cized Frye as poorly suited to the complexities of DNA analy-
sis,3" the mere presence of the Frye questions assures that the
complexities of the analysis will be contemplated. At the very
least, Frye gives the scientific community some time to reflect
upon the novel method and remove deficiencies that may exist.
Although judicial tribunals are deprived of potentially useful
scientific evidence during this waiting period, the Frye mandate
requires that a theory and/or technique for which general accep-
tance does not exist should not be used. In contexts in which
there is a criminal defendant, as the case with Frye and with
most DNA profiling cases, there is a high standard of proof, a
situation somewhat different than Daubert, which was a civil
case.
31
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Standards
1. Pre-Daubert.
The Federal Rules of Evidence discuss scientific evidence in
Rule 702, which requires that scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence.3 2 This "helpfulness standard" might be thought to conflict
with Frye's austere general acceptance test. Prior to Daubert,
there was uncertainty over whether or not the Frye test survived
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. 33 In the
discussion preceding the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
'o Comment, Beyond People v. Castro: A New Standard forAdmissibility forfDNA Finger-
printing, 7 J Contemp Health L & Policy 269, 270 (1991); Comment, DNA Fingerprinting:
Is it Ready for Trial, 45 U Miami L Rev 243 (1990).
" Furthermore, in the criminal arena, the law enforcement establishment will be the
proponent of the technique which is used repeatedly against unrelated individual defen-
dants, while in many civil cases the individual plaintiff (or perhaps a class of plaintiffs)
will be the proponent of the technique against a "deep pockets" defendant in nominally a
single episode. While the liberal policy of Daubert will benefit civil plaintiffs, this policy
will work to the disadvantage of criminal defendants during the transitional period in
which a technique is not optimized. Although a technique such as DNA profiling should be
neutral, in the sense that it can inculpate or exculpate, profiling was in fact used more by
law enforcement institutions for inculpation than by individuals for exculpation.
" Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
' Christophersen v Allied Signal Corporation, 939 F2d 1106, 1120 (5th Cir 1991)
(The court applied a combined Frye and Federal Rules of Evidence standard. The concur-
ring opinion questioned whether Frye had survived the enactment of the Federal Rules.
Christopherson is disapproved by Daubert, 113 S Ct 2786.
[1993:
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dence, there was little consideration of the subject of scientific
evidence.' Furthermore, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule
702 does not mention Frye's general acceptance test. If Frye was
merely a rule of evidence, and not a substantive rule, many
scholars did not believe that it did survive. 5 The use of Frye in
the Federal courts was sporadic after the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. In the area of voiceprint identification, Frye
was invoked to block admission in United States v McDaniel,"5
but Rule 403 allowed admissibility in United States v Baller37
and in United States v Williams."
Under United States v Williams, the Federal Rules approach
involved a balancing test that weighs the probativeness,39 mate-
riality," and reliability of the evidence against the tendency to
mislead or confuse the jury, or unfairly prejudice the defen-
dant.41 The specific legal meaning of "reliability" is that a cor-
rect answer is sufficiently probable for a given situation.42 The
term reliability thus imports the scientific concepts of accuracy
("correct") and precision ("sufficiently probable"). In the case of a
scientific technique, there are several factors to consider to es-
tablish reliability of a technique:
1. the potential rate of error,
2. the existence and maintenance of standards,
3. the care with which the scientific technique has been
employed and whether it is susceptible to abuse,
4. whether there are analogous relationships with other
types of scientific techniques that are routinely admitted
Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 374 (West,
1992).
' Christophersen, 939 F2d at 1120; see also 22 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 5168 at 89-90 (1978). For another issue of statutory construction, see
the analysis ofthe doctrine of abandonment inMidlantic National Bank v New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, 474 US 494, 500-01 (1986).
United States v McDaniel, 538 F2d 408, 412-13 (DC Cir 1976).
3 United States v Baller, 519 F2d 463, 466 (4th Cir 1975).
United States v Williams, 583 F2d 1194 (2d Cir 1978).
39 Probative evidence is that which furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward
proof. Probative evidence is relevant. Relevant evidence makes the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. FRE 401.
"' Material evidence is evidence which is important to the question in controversy,
and which must necessarily enter into the consideration of the controversy, and which by
itself or in connection with other evidence is determinative of the case.
41 Williams, 583 F2d at 1198.
"' Christophersen, 939 F2d at 1111 (citing Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific
Evidence, 56 Fordham L Rev 595 (1988)).
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into evidence,
5. the presence of failsafe characteristics."
Depending upon what balances of factors one chooses to
make, one can get different tests for admissibility from the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. The most generous reading of Rules 401
on relevant evidence,' 403 on exclusion of relevant evidence,45
and 703 on expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible
hearsay,46 leads to McCormick's relevancy test: "[any relevant
conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be
received [into evidence] unless there are reasons for exclusion."47
A recent commentator argued that the test articulated in United
States v Downing48 is more stringent, and is superior to both
Frye and McCormick's relevancy test for determining admissibili-
ty of DNA evidence.49 Unlike the relevancy test, the Downing
test balances reliability, not probative value, against prejudicial
effect.5" Unlike Frye, the Downing test considers the given
method's relationship to more established scientific procedures,
the existence of scientific literature evaluating the technique, and
the frequency with which the technique leads to erroneous re-
sults.51
"' Jakobetz, 747 F Supp at 254, quoting Williams, 583 F2d at 1198-99. Failsafe proce-
dures are designed to prevent malfunctioning through an intricate system of protective
devices; ideally, they would thwart human error. But see Eugene Burdick and Harvey
Wheeler, Failsafe (McGraw-Hill, 1962).
" Rule 401 states: 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
" Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative val-
ue is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
'c Rule 703 states: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
informing opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence."
4 C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, § 203 at 608 (West, 3d ed 1984).
United States v Downing, 753 F2d 1224 (3d Cir 1985).
4 Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 331 (cited in note 21).
Furthermore, in the Downing test reliability is weighed directly against prejudice,
while in relevancy, probative evidence must be substantially outweighed by prejudice to
be rendered inadmissible.
" Although the Downing test is more stringent than the relevancy test, it asks fewer
questions than Williams. Since scientists would consider the four Downing factors (as well
as others) in forming their Frye judgment, the real question remains: who interprets the
data, scientists or judges?
Frye after Daubert
2. Daubert v Merrell Dow.
Daubert held that Frye was superseded by the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The remaining question before the
Daubert Court was, which Rules? First, Rule 402, which "pro-
vides the baseline," and more specifically, Rule 702, which gov-
erns expert testimony, are the sources from which the Court
fashions "some general observations" to structure the trial judge's
inquiry.
52
Under Daubert, the judge, rather than the relevant scientific
community, is the final arbiter over any dispute over the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence. In this role, the judge is guided pri-
marily by Rule 702 and also by Rules 703-706. Rule 702 spells
out the trial judge's obligation: "[i]f scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.. . [an expert] may
testify thereto...." According to Daubert, therefore, "'[s]cientific
knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability,"
while, the requirement that the evidence assist the trier of fact
"goes primarily to relevance.""3
However, unlike the previous articulation of the Federal
Rules standard in Williams, the trial judge must make an initial
determination as to the relevance and reliability, pursuant to
Rule 104(a), which entails "a preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scien-
tifically valid. . . ." The Court set out some general guidelines
for the trial judge to follow in making this initial determination
of scientific validity. These are: "whether a theory or technique
can be (and has been) tested," "whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication," consideration
of the "known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation."
The Court also notes that, in this inquiry, "[gleneral accep-
tance.., can.., have a bearing on the inquiry."55 The Court
concludes by stating that the "[o]verarching subject is the scien-
tific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliabili-
ty-of the principles that underlie a proposed submission."56 The
62 Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2796.
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Daubert court emphasized the flexibility of this inquiry57 and
expressed no preference among several approaches.58
There are thus two major practical differences between the
Federal Rules based standard articulated in Daubert and the
Frye standard which is imposed against the background Federal
Rules. First, in Daubert, general acceptance by the relevant sci-
entific community is not an absolute prerequisite for the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence-in Frye, it is. Second, since it is not,
and since a technique's validity must still be ascertained, the
trial judge is given a laundry list of factors with which to screen
for scientific validity. Therefore, the trial judge, and not a rele-
vant scientific community, is the real referee over scientific valid-
ity. Furthermore, the inquiry itself is different. In applying the
Daubert factors to analyze specific scientific evidence, the trial
judge is looking only for certain manifestations of validity, rather
than inspecting the cogency of reasoning underlying the evidence,
as would be done by scientists under Frye.
3. Criticism of the Federal Rules Standards.
The issue with the various Federal Rules approaches is
amorphous structure: various laundry lists of factors are com-
bined in arbitrary ways by nonexperts to produce unknown prob-
abilities of accuracy to be balanced against unmeasured prejudic-
es. Moreover, a serious difficulty arises in situations for which
the only information available may be the information of the
proponent. The only way to validate the technique and the specif-
ic data obtained from the technique will be through information
supplied by the proponent of the evidence. Although Daubert
assigns the trial judge with the responsibility for assessing the
scientific validity of the technique, it does not provide the means
to make this assessment. In the absence of sources independent
of the proponent, the judge has no way to truly assess validity or
reliability.
Consider an example. Suppose that there were only one
laboratory in the world that purported to measure the weight
percentage of carbon in diamond by burning the carbon of dia-
mond to carbon dioxide. The technique gave a result of (99.5±0.1)
wgt% carbon. The reproducibility was excellent, standards were
5 Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2790, 2797.
5 "To the extent that they focus on the reliability of evidence as ensured by the sci-
entific validity of its underlying principles, all these versions may well have merit, al-
though we express no opinion regarding any of their particular details." Id at 2797.
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maintained, great care was exercised, the technique was similar
to known techniques, and many papers were published. All the
manifestations of reliability were present. This is sufficient to
prove precision, but it does not prove accuracy. There could have
been systematic error. Maybe there was incomplete combustion
and the true number is 100 wgt% carbon. Maybe there were
impurities and the true number is 99 wgt% carbon. There is
simply no way of knowing whether the number is accurate in the
absence of independent confirmatory analyses.59
To establish the accuracy of the number, inquiry would have
to be made into the validity of the technique. A difficulty with
the approach of the Federal Rules is its emphasis on
probativeness and reliability, very pliable legal concepts, in pref-
erence to a real inquiry into validity, a concept which reaches the
visceral scientific merit of the method and which, as such, under-
lies the Frye approach. 0 A proponent will always introduce the
"best data" available to show that the technique is reliable, in the
sense that the answers obtained are accurate and precise. To
insure that the science is indeed good science, the court must
look beyond empirical results, which in fact may be not only
hyperbolic, but also contested, to get to the underlying reasoning
of the theory and method. While Daubert allows for this inquiry,
it is one clearly beyond the competence of the trial judge to
make. The court should look to the scientists to explicate the
issues. The difficulty with the Federal Rules approaches is that
only the trial judge stands as a filter against bad science; in
practice, then, an articulate, but scientifically incompetent, pro-
ponent can successfully introduce most evidence.
9 As discussed below, one way to get at the accuracy of scientific techniques is to
submit samples of composition known to the submitter, but not to the analyzer. Prefera-
bly, the analyzer should be unaware that a control test is being done, so that the sample
is treated with the same care as a routine sample.
6 A validity issue defeated the DNA evidence of Lifecodes in the "false positive" case
of Maine v McLeod. Colin Norman, Maine Case Deals Blow to DNA Fingerprinting, 246
Science 1556 (Dec 22, 1989). The refusal of the court in United States v Yee, 134 FRD 161
(N D Ohio 1991) to deal with issues of validity led to the publication of Richard C.
Lewontin and Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254 Science
1745 (Dec 20, 1991), which in turn may have affected the final NRC report which came
out in April 1992.
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II. THE SUPERIORITY OF FRYE AS SEEN THROUGH THE EXAMPLE
OF DNA PROFILING
The use of Frye in the federal courts was sporadic after the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In DNA profiling cas-
es, the evidentiary standards for admissability were hybrids. In
the first Federal Court of Appeals holding on DNA profiling in
United States v Two Bulls, the court's final order was
61
The trial court is to decide
(1) whether DNA evidence is generally accepted by the scien-
tific community,
(2) whether the testing procedures used in this case are
generally accepted as reliable if properly performed,
(3) whether the test was performed properly in this case,
(4) whether the evidence is more prejudicial than probative
in this case, and
(5) whether the statistics used to determine the probability
of someone else having the same genetic characteristics is
more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403.
In the second Federal Court of Appeals holding on DNA profiling
in United States v Jakobetz, the court noted that the District
Court's findings "would satisfy not only the Frye standard, but
the Two Bulls and Castro standard as well."6 2
The report by the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences on DNA Technology in Forensic Science sets
guidelines for testing which may render court decisions more
uniform. In a decision made after the release of the report, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied a pure Frye stan-
dard to admit the DNA profiling evidence and to suggest that
probabilities for which the requisite consensus exists would be
admissible.63 The scientific analysis that formed the conclusions
of this report is discussed in this section. This is done both to
demonstrate the process of establishing validity in the scientific
61 United States v Two Bulls, 918 F2d 56, 61 (8th Cir 1990).
United States v Jakobetz, 955 F2d 786, 799 (2d Cir 1992). Although the district
court below had considered only the Federal Rule-based Williams standard, the Court of
Appeals made the conclusion that profiling passed Frye. The Jakobetz decision came out
in the time window between the December 20, 1991 issue of Science (which made clear
that DNA probability assessments were not accepted by all scientists) and the April 1992
release of the NRC report (which advocated a conservative approach to probabilities). The
admissibility standard of Jakobetz is analyzed in Comment, Admissibility of Forensic DNA
Profiling: A Movement away from Frye, 44 Wash U J Urb & Contemp L 211 (1993).
13 United States v Porter, 618 A2d 629, 633-36 (DC 1992).
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community and to illustrate the difficulty a trial judge may have
in reaching any accurate conclusion without such a rigorous
procedure.
In the following, basic concepts are introduced in section A,
scientific issues involved in the match component of DNA pro-
filing are in section B, and scientific issues involved in the proba-
bility component of DNA profiling are in section C.
A. Basic Concepts
Before going into the details of DNA profiling, one must
recognize that there are two distinct components of the method:
defining the existence of a match and assessing the probabilistic
significance of the match.
In the matching component in a criminal case, one is com-
paring DNA evidence from the crime scene to DNA evidence
obtained from the suspect (or possibly the victim) to see if they
match. In a typical example involving the crime of rape, one
would compare the DNA of the semen found at the crime scene to
DNA from the blood of the suspect. The matching component of
DNA profiling is a complicated experimental procedure involving
several steps. Experimental errors can be made both within the
taking of the DNA samples" and through the experimental ma-
nipulation of the DNA samples."
If the two samples of DNA do not match, the suspect is ex-
culpated. This outcome occurs in practice about 30% of the
time.66 If a match is found, the suspect is inculpated, and one
For example, the DNA sample at the crime scene may have deteriorated through
environmental exposure, or there may be confusion because of the presence of DNA of
several different humans, not all of whom are identified.
' The DNA of the crime scene sample might have been affected by ambient agents so
that it appears to be different in electrophoresis than if it were not so affected. Thus,
chemical or biological entities might have already cut the DNA transverse to its length
axis before the restriction fragment length polymorphism ("HFLP") enzyme (see notes 67-
68 and accompanying text) was added, so that the fragments appear smaller than they
should be. Or, chemical entities might have inserted ("intercalated") between the base
pairs (see section HAI. below), so that the fragments appear larger than they should be.
Separately, there might be variations in the experimental conditions themselves: non-
uniform electrophoresis plate or uneven film expansion. These factors tend to make
something that was a match appear not to be a match. However, acceptance of such vari-
ability might lead to a tendency to accept slightly non-matching data as being a match.
See the discussion of Maine v McLeod in Norman, 246 Science at 1556 (cited in note 60).
Also, there is current debate about the inculpation of David Hicks on the basis of DNA
profiling. William B. Falk, DNA and Truth; Genetic 'Fingerprint' Can be Smudged by
Human Error, Newsday 7 (Dec 7, 1992).
' Kenneth W. Nimmich, chief of the Scientific Analysis Section of the FBI, as quoted
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continues to the second component of the DNA profiling method.
Here, the experimental result is compared to databases of DNA
profiles to determine how likely a second person, other than the
suspect, would have DNA which would match that of the crime
scene. This second component of DNA profiling involves no addi-
tional laboratory work, although it does involve utilization of
theories of statistics and population genetics.
1. DNA structure.
The genetic information of an individual is encoded in the
person's DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). The manner of this encod-
ing is structural, specifically determined by sequences of funda-
mental subunits. No two individuals, other than identical twins,
have the same DNA.
A simplistic model of the structure of DNA is a ladder. The
poles of the ladder are made of a sugar-phosphate backbone. The
rungs are the critical feature, and each rung is composed of a
pair of molecules referred to as a base pair. Genetic information
is conveyed in the sequence of base pairs along the ladder. Al-
though in the real world the DNA ladder is curved to form a
helix, the simple, two-dimensional ladder model is sufficient to
understand the basics of the chemistries involved in the match
component of profiling.
There are only four molecules involved in the rungs of the
ladder: adenine (A), guanine (G), thymine (T), and cytosine (C).
Furthermore, adenine pairs only with thymine, and guanine
pairs only with cytosine, so that the only rungs that can exist are
A-T or G-C.
Certain processes associated with DNA profiling can be easi-
ly envisioned in terms of the ladder model. There are two obvious
ways in which one could symmetrically break down the ladder.
One could cut the poles transverse to the length axis, thereby
making shorter ladders. Or, one could cut the rungs longitudinal-
ly (between the A-T or G-C bonds) to form two half-ladders, each
having only a single pole. Not surprisingly, biologists do both.
Restriction enzymes, which are employed in the typical re-
striction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) profiling meth-
od,67 cut the DNA transverse to the ladder axis at known points
by Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rape Conviction Overturned on DNA Tests, NY Times B6 (Dec 2,
1992).
67 The other technique used for forensic DNA analysis is polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), a subject of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1993. The idea behind PCR is to make
[1993:
Frye after Daubert
on the ladder; this converts the large DNA ladder into smaller
DNA ladder fragments.
In contrast, denaturing splits the DNA ladder down the
length axis, so that one ends up with two molecules, each con-
taining one pole attached to a set of individual bases. More sim-
ply, the denaturing process can also be envisioned as unzipping a
zipper. If one knew the identity of one such single-pole (or half-
zipper) entity, one could predict the sequencing of bases in its
conjugate. Since one can have only A-T or G-C pairs, the pres-
ence of an A at a particular point in one molecule would require
a T to exist at the same point in the conjugate. To expand, if one
found a fragment AAAGGTTTT, one would know the conjugate to
be TTTCCAAAA.
One can envision the basics of DNA profiling by reference to
the ladder model. First, longitudinal and transverse cuts are
made, so that one obtains a mixture of short, half-ladders. Then,
one adds to this mixture a half-ladder of a very specific base
sequence (the "probe"), which will reform a short ladder fragment
only with its conjugate sequence. In this hybridization step of
RFLP analysis, the probe is typically radioactively labeled so that
the resultant reformed short ladder fragment can be identified.
By varying the base sequence of the probe, the scientist analyzes
different base sequences of the DNA.
Although the full DNA structure is not adequately represent-
ed by a ladder," the ladder model can illustrate the awesome-
ness of the DNA molecule. The human DNA ladder is composed
of 3 billion rungs. If unfolded, the DNA from a single cell would
be about 1.5 meters in length, and the total DNA from a human
body would stretch 93 billion miles. However expansive these
numbers are, one must note that DNA profiling deals with only a
small fraction of the DNA molecule, and does not purport to
match one molecule with another molecule. If the entirety of the
many copies of a given fragment; thus, the test has advantages over RFLP when there is
little DNA sample available. The technique is described by George F. Sensabaugh and
Cecilia von Beroldingen, The Polymerase Chain Reaction: Application to the Analysis of
Biological Evidence, in Mark A. Farley and James J. Harrington, eds, Forensic DNA
Technology at 63-82 (Lewis, 1991). The PCR test is available through Cetus Corporation;
the PCR technology was adopted by the Suffolk County, New York crime lab in 1992.
Falk, Newsday at 7 (cited in note 65). Labs employing the more common RFLP tests may
save some crime scene DNA sample for PCR testing. Michael L. Baird, Analysis of Foren-
sic DNA Sample by Single Locus VNTR Probes in Farley and Harrington, eds, Forensic
DNA Technology at 39.
' Jan A. Witkowski, Milestones in the Development of DNA Technology, in Farley and
Harrington, eds, Forensic DNA Technology at 1-23 (cited in note 67).
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molecule were analyzed, one would reach only the first compo-
nent of the DNA profiling method, and the theoretical assump-
tion of DNA uniqueness would render the probabilisitic analysis
of the second component unnecessary. That is, if there were a
match of every base pair between crime scene DNA and suspect
DNA, the fundamental assumption of DNA uniqueness would
prove inculpation. It is because every base pair is not analyzed
that probabilistic analysis is undertaken.
2. Nomenclature.
Thus, although individuation by DNA analysis has been
referred to as "fingerprinting,"9 such terminology is falling into
disfavor because of the inaccuracy of the analogy between DNA
profiling and traditional fingerprinting." Approximately 99% of
the three billion base pairs of DNA are in the same sequence for
all humans and thus are not useful for individuation. DNA profil-
ing takes advantage of the presence of that small fraction of DNA
which is not equivalent for all humans.
An image of DNA profiling as the lining up of two fingerprint
images on a screen, which might be conveyed by the term "DNA
fingerprinting," is misleading.7' Of the one percent of the DNA
which is variable among humans, only a small fraction is ever
analyzed, so that DNA profiling involves investigation of only a
minority of a minority of the base sequences of the DNA.
Even within this limit, one notes that the regions used for
profiling, although not identical for all humans, are identical
among some humans. Individuation is accomplished by analyzing
several different regions of the DNA molecule. Declaring a match
is somewhat akin to identifying a suspect as the perpetrator
because suspect and perpetrator have many common traits:
brown hair, blue eyes, a wart on the nose, a dueling scar on the
cheek. In DNA profiling, the DNA of the suspect and perpetrator
are compared at only a few sites on the DNA molecule.
" Comment, 45 U Miami L Rev 243 (cited in note 30); Comment, 7 J Contemp
Health L & Policy at 269 (cited in note 30).
70 Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Crim-
inal Defendant, 42 Stan L Rev 465 n 3 (1990); Lewontin and Hartl, 254 Science at 1745
(cited in note 60); Edward Humes, The DNA Wars, LA Times 20 (Nov 29, 1992).
" Nevertheless, as with fingerprints, a database is being developed. The FBI labora-
tory is working with the states to develop the combined DNA index system (CODIS), a
national DNA database. William Sessions, prepared statement to Subcommittee on Civil




B. Identification of Issues in the Matching Component of
Profiling
1. More detailed terminology.
In profiling, the DNA molecule is cut, transverse to the lad-
der axis, into smaller pieces called fragments. To focus on indi-
viduation, the molecule is cut at very specific points, to yield
(some) fragments that are different for most individuals. The
cutting is done by a restriction enzyme (also called restriction
endonuclease) and the portion of the DNA which is cut out which
is variable among humans is thus called a restriction fragment
length polymorphism (RFLP).
At present, DNA profiling done by the commercial laborato-
ries Lifecodes and Cellmark, and by the FBI, uses variable re-
gions that occur on only one site (or locus) of the DNA molecule.
These fragments are referred to as variable number tandem
repeats (VNTRs) or minisatellites. The fragments are composed
of a fundamental core, made up of from 9-64 base pairs, which is
tandemly .repeated. There is variability among humans in the
sense that a fundamental building block (core) is repeated a
different number of times for different people. One has the rela-
tionship:
molecular weight of total fragment =
(number of repeated units) X (molecular weight of unit).
A given VNTR fragment is said to be polymorphic, with different
individuals having different numbers of the fundamental unit.
However intricate the experimental details, the conceptual
design of DNA profiling is relatively simple. A given DNA spec-
imen is cleaved with a restriction length enzyme to create frag-
ments. A sample of the fragment solution is placed on an electro-
phoresis plate, and -an electric field is applied. Because the frag-
ments are electrically charged, they move under the presence of
the field. The lower in molecular weight the fragment, the fur-
ther it will move down on the plate in a given period of time. The
fragments, now dispersed along a track according to their molec-
ular weight, are denatured and transferred to a nylon membrane.
The scientist determines a particular VNTR sequence to be stud-
ied and adds the probe of conjugate base sequence to the nylon
membrane. Said probe will bind only to the appropriate VNTR,
and no other. Because the probe is radioactively labelled, the
position of the VNTR along the track can be identified by the
location of the radioactivity. Typically, this is done by placing a
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photographic film on top of the nylon membrane; the developed
film is termed an autorad. A given probe can be washed off the
membrane, and a different probe, conjugate to a different VNTR
can be added, and the process repeated. For ease in representa-
tion, the DNA of the crime scene, the DNA of the suspect, and
calibrating (bacterial) DNA are typically placed on different
tracks on the same plate/nylon membrane. To see if a match
exists, one merely looks to see if one has the same VNTRs at the
same molecular weights for crime scene and suspect DNA. Typi-
cally, four different VNTRs might be studied.72
The scientific logic of DNA profiling for individuation is as
follows. There is a generally accepted proposition that the DNA
molecule of a given individual is unique, except for the case of
identical twins. There is a generally accepted proposition that
this uniqueness is manifested in variations in the sizes of VNTRs
from one individual to another. There is a conceptual disagree-
ment over the basis of size variation in VNTRs and there is a
fundamental disagreement about how to convert the VNTR size
information into probabilities.
2. The proper model to describe size variation of VNTRs.
Supporters of the current DNA profiling approach, including
Professors Ranajit Chakraborty and Kenneth Kidd, consider
VNTRs to be traditional alleles." Thus, VNTRs segregate ac-
cording to Mendelian principles.
Chakraborty and Kidd acknowledge certain differences be-
tween VNTRs and traditional alleles.74 First, VNTRs have a
higher mutation rate, which could affect the accuracy of iden-
tifications between related people (for example, parent/child).
Second, there is more variability in a VNTR at a specific site on
DNA than for a traditional allele. Thus, one might have a hand-
ful of traditional alleles for a given site on the DNA, but one can
have a hundred possible VNTR alleles. Third, because of techni-
cal limits in measuring molecular weight, one must treat the
72 A given VNTR sequence may give rise to two bands in the autorad, one weight
range inherited from the father, a different weight range from the mother. About 87% of
alleles are heterozygous. See Jakobetz, 747 F Supp at 253.
" Ranajit Chakraborty and Kenneth Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic
Work, 254 Science 1735 (Dec 20, 1991). An allele is one of two or more alternative forms
of a gene occupying the same locus on the DNA molecule; the different alleles in Mendel's
peas gave rise to the different colors.
" Id at 1736.
[1993:
Frye after Daubert
VNTR alleles as if they formed a quasicontinuous series.
In contrast, critics of the early "fingerprinting" schemes, such
as Professors Richard Lewontin and Daniel Hartl, analogize
variations in VNTR sizes to a quasicontinuous array of pheno-
types, such as height or weight.75 In this view, the fundamental
identity of VNTRs, rather than technical limitations, forces the
quasicontinuous treatment of molecular weight. Given that the
molecular weight of a VNTR fragment can be measured only with
a standard deviation of ± 0.6% of the mean molecular weight,
there is a potential that people with VNTRs of different sizes
would be experimentally indistinguishable. Sample calculations
illustrate the problem. Consider a 2 X 2 grid, in which bp desig-
nates base pair, kb designates kilobase (that is, 1000 rungs on
the DNA ladder):
fragment wgt = 2kb fragment wgt = 10 kb
9 bp in core 0.6% = 12 bp = 1.3 core 0.6% = 60 bp = 6.7 core
1.2% = 24 bp = 2.6 core 1.2% = 120 bp = 13.3 core
1.8% = 36 bp = 3.9 core 1.8% = 180 bp = 20.0 core
30 bp in core 0.6% = 12 bp = 0.4 core 0.6% = 60 bp = 2.0 core
1.2% = 24 bp = 0.8 core .2% = 120 bp = 4.0 core
1.8% = 36 bp = 1.2 core 1.8% = 180 bp = 6.0 core
For a VNTR core unit of 30 base pairs, an uncertainty of
0.6% of molecular weight (=1 standard deviation) or of 1.2% of
molecular weight (=2 standard deviations) does not produce an
uncertainty greater than 1 core unit. Thus, the experimental
uncertainty is small enough to allow the determination of the
number of repeated cores to within one core unit, and individuals
who have a different number of core units at the DNA locus can
be distinguished. However, for the other cases, the uncertainty is
greater than one core unit, and individuals who have a different
number of core units at the DNA locus cannot be distinguished.
Thus, with respect to the issue of false positives, there are situa-
tions in which one could match within the limits of experimental
error, but not match within the context of the underlying theory.
Typically, the private labs have declared a match between crime
scene and suspect DNA if the two are within three standard
' Lewontin and Hart, 254 Science at 1746 (cited in note 60).
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deviations (1.8% of molecular weight);76 the FBI lab uses a
binning approach.77
The experimental issues of declaring a match are non-trivial.
The California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors
(CACLD) submits test samples to the private DNA testing labo-
ratories, Lifecodes and Cellmark." In a group of 50 samples
sent in 1987, Cellmark had one false positive, for an error level of
2%. In a group of 50 samples sent in 1988, Cellmark gain had
one false positive.79 In the 1988 samples, Lifecodes twice failed
to recognize mixtures; they reported samples as arising from one
person, when in fact two were represented in the sample.0
How comfortable one should be with a test of 98% accuracy
depends critically on who is being tested. First, consider the
mathematics of a test which is 98% reliable as applied to a popu-
lation of 10,000 which is composed of 7,000 guilty people and
3,000 innocent people. Of the guilty, 6,860 guilty people will be
correctly identified and 140 people will be false negatives. Of the
innocent, 2,940 innocent people will be correctly identified, and
60 innocent people will be false positives. If you test positive, the
probability of your being incorrectly identified is 60/6860, or only
0.9%. However, if the 98% reliable test is applied to a population
of 10,000 which is composed of only 200 guilty people and 9,800
innocent people, the situation is different. Of the guilty, 196
"' A separate issue is the relationship between match criteria used in the matching
component of DNA profiling and match criteria used in the probabilistic component of
DNA profiling. Lifecodes used a window of + 3 standard deviations for the first component
but used a window of only ± (2/3) of a standard deviation for the second component. Eric
Lander analogized this process to catching butterflies with a 10 foot wide net, but then at-
tempting to prove the difficulty of the feat by showing how hard it is to catch butterflies
with a six inch wide net. Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 339 Nature 501,
504 (1989).
" United States v Yee, 134 FRD 161, 172 (N D Ohio 1991) (Magistrate's Report and
Recommendation adopted by the Court); Yee was affirmed under the Daubert standard in
United States v Bonds, Verdi, and Yee, 1993 US App LEXIS 32574. Because VNTRs are
numerous and sometimes close together, it is at times difficult to tell where the bands
from one VNTR stop and those belonging to another start. VNTR frequencies can be
estimated by creating bins (intervals) that have arbitrary boundary points, usually
defined with reference to bacterial DNA fragments. All measured bands falling within the
bin are identified as the same VNTR.
' William C. Thompson and Simon Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources of Ambi-
guity in the Interpretation of DNA Prints in Farley and Harrington, eds, Forensic DNA
Technology, at 142-44 (cited in note 67).
" Id. See also Falk, Newsday at 7 (cited in note 65): "If the samples had been from
actual criminal cases, Cellmark could have linked two innocent people to murders or
rapes. And juries would have been told the chance of error was less than one in a million."
o Id. In contrast, the FBI laboratory is tested on a regular basis and has never been
found to have made a false match. State v Harris, 1992 Tenn Crim App LEXIS 492, *12.
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guilty people will be correctly identified, and there will be 4 false
negatives. Of the innocent, 9604 innocent people will be correctly
identified, and there will be 196 false positives. If you test posi-
tive, the probability of your being incorrectly identified is
196/392, or 50%.
C. Identification of Issues in the Probability Component of
Profiling
Consider a hypothetical situation in which DNA profiling
might be used. In the investigation of a rape, a comparison be-
tween the DNA of the semen removed from the victim and the
DNA of the suspect's blood shows a match for all six of the
VNTRs studied. The court needs to know the probability of a
match between the DNA semen and any given person. The ana-
lytical situation presented is analogous to that found in People v
Collins."'
Simplifying somewhat, in Collins, an eyewitness to a robbery
testified to the existence of six facts: 1. the robbers had a yellow
car, 2. the man had a mustache, 3. the girl had a ponytail, 4. the
girl had blond hair, 5. the man had a beard, and 6. the robbers
were interracial. The prosecution brought in a mathematician
who assigned probabilities for the existence of each factor, multi-
plied them together, and concluded that the probability that any
given couple would exhibit all six factors was 1 in 12 million.
There was an issue of how the probability of each factor could be
measured. Furthermore, there was an issue of statistical inde-
pendence, for by multiplying each probability, the expert was im-
plicitly assuming that the presence of each factor was indepen-
dent of the presence, or absence, of the other factors." In fact,
one could argue that a man with a mustache is more likely to
have a beard than a man without a mustache, and the probabili-
ties are not independent.
In the rape hypothetical, the match of the six VNTRs is like
the match of the six facts in Collins, and the problems are to
assign correctly the individual probabilities and to determine
whether or not statistical independence exists. Or, as Richard
Lewontin and Daniel Hartl phrased the questions,
"I People v Collins, 68 Cal 2d 319, 66 Cal Rptr 497, 438 P2d 33 (Cal 1968); 36 ALR 3d
1176.
2 Id at 37 n 10.
219] 241
242 The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
1. From which reference population does one get the proba-
bilities for the individual bands?
2. After determining the answer to 1, how does one combine
the data of the probabilities for individual bands into a prob-
ability for the occurrence of all bands?83
Of the first question, Lewontin and Hartl illustrated possible
complexities by comparing the probabilities of occurrence of six
specific blood group genes between Polish and Italian popula-
tions. The six genes were far more prevalent in the Polish popu-
lation, with a probability of 1 in 14,000 of a match to all six. For
the Italian population, the probability was 1 in 3.3 million. Ap-
plying these numbers to the above rape hypo, with all other fac-
tors equal, a match to an Italian suspect would be 240 times
"more incriminating" than a match to a Polish suspect. Consider
another variation. Following a match of several VNTRs pursuant
to a rape case, the FBI declares the probability of match between
the crime scene DNA and any given person to be 150 million to 1.
However, the suspect's brother may be implicated, and the proba-
bility that the brother's DNA may match is between 128 and 256
to 1.84
Of the second question, Lewontin and Hartl pointed out that
the VNTRs may be in a state of linkage disequilibrium, in which
case the probabilities of individual VNTRs may not be indepen-
dent of the probabilities of other VNTRs. Lewontin and Hartl
made three recommendations:
1. Don't multiply.
2. Use ethnic ceilings.
3. Expand the current databases.85
In the final report of the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences, which issued about four months
after the LewontinlHartl paper was published, suggestions 2 and
3 were incorporated. 8 The multiplication rule is combined with
what is called the "ceiling principle."
In the near future, the report recommends that the probabili-
ty for any VNTR be the highest frequency found for any of the
three major population groups in the United States (Caucasian,
Lewontin and Hartl, 254 Science at 1746 (cited in note 60).
Bruce Rensberger, FBI Chief Backs DNA 'Fingerprinting', Wash Post A17 (Dec 25,
1991).
Lewontin and Hart, 254 Science at 1749 (cited in note 60).
Roberts, 256 Science at 301 (cited in note 18).
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African-American, Hispanic), or 10%, whichever is higher. In the
rape hypothetical with a match of six VNTRs, this NAS rule
would mean that the probability of a match to anyone could be
no higher than one in a million. If a given VNTR is found to be
more probable than one in ten in any given population group, the
cumulative probability would go proportionately below one in a
million.
The NRC report recommended the analysis of 100 individu-
als in each of 15 to 20 genetically homogeneous populations (for
example, English, German, Russian, Vietnamese, Puerto Rican).
With this database created, the NAS rule would be that the prob-
ability for any VNTR would be the highest frequency found in
any of the populations, or 5%, which ever is higher. In the rape
hypothetical with a match of six VNTRs, this NAS rule would
mean that the probability of a match to anyone could be no high-
er than one in 64 million.
Initially, both sides of the theoretical debate seemed to be
comfortable with this compromise."7 There was far less contro-
versy over the adoption of recommendations for mandatory ac-
creditation of DNA typing labs and mandatory proficiency tests.
Ironically, the largest potential source of error lies in poor labora-
tory practice, an issue not covered in the original Frye standard,
rather than in the validity of the underlying scientific method, an
issue covered by Frye.
D. Dealing with Serial Multi-component Scientific Method
In DNA profiling, one first performs a matching experiment
in the laboratory. Only if there is evidence of a match is the
probabilistic assessment made. In a serial, multi-step method,
error inherent in earlier steps propagates to later steps. If the
frequency of laboratory error with respect to false positives is 1
in every 50 at the first step, it is meaningless to discuss an over-
all frequency of error of 1 in a million or 1 in a billion. The over-
all frequency of error is still at least 1 in every 50.
To see this more clearly, let us assume, contrary to fact, the
entire DNA molecule is analyzed, and the probability of error in
the second step is zero. The overall probability of error is not
But, see Devlin, Risch and Roeder, 259 Science at 748 nn 6-14 (cited in note 19).
The authors state: "In conclusion, we have serious concerns that the erroneous assump-
tions and conclusions in the NRC report are receiving undue weight in judiciary decisions.
It would be unfortunate if these errors were to influence decisions of the admissibility of a
very powerful forensic tool." Id at 837.
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zero, because non-zero error still resides in the first step. In this
idealized world, such error might arise from stupid human mis-
takes, such as misidentified samples, but it is nevertheless non-
zero error, which should be quantified and presented.
In the real world, unfortunate laboratory errors do occur, not
only in DNA profiling" but also in methods related to DNA pro-
filing. 9 Furthermore, as noted above, the currently available
experimental methods of measuring molecular weight of frag-
ments are incommensurate with the theory; since a three stan-
dard deviation window is used, fragments with different numbers
of base pairs can be considered to be equal.9 ° This does not sug-
gest that DNA profiling should not be admissible; merely, the
proponent should adequately account for the existence of such
mistakes in a discussion of the overall frequency of error.
This discussion should be from an ex ante perspective, per-
haps based on the results of the mandatory proficiency testing
suggested by the NRC report. The objective is to establish the
frequency of error of the laboratory in attaining the result of the
generally accepted technique.
III. FRYE AND WHY
In the five year interval between the first appellate DNA
case91 and the present, no court has held DNA matching evi-
dence inadmissible because the theory or underlying technique
were either not generally accepted or not reliable. Specific test
results were held inadmissible because of faulty lab practice in
Castro,9' Ex Parte Perry,9 and State v Woodall94 and there
was a question of the extension to forensic science in Two
Lander, 339 Nature at 501 (cited in note 76).
9 Prater v State, 307 Ark 120, 820 SW2d 429, 432 (Ark 1991).
I am not suggesting that DNA profiling necessarily leads to inaccurate results be-
cause of this. However, there is squarely a Frye prong two issue because the technique is
insufficient to show that there are the same number of base pairs in the fragments of sus-
pect and crime scene VNTRs, as is required by the theory. The statement "all individuals
have unique DNA" implies that a match requires the suspect and crime scene VNTRs to
have exactly the same number base pairs in VNTRs, not just a similar number. The
technique treats anything within ± 1.8% (or ± 2.5% for the FBI) as being the same. Thus.
the proponents of profiling in Maine v McLeod declared a match to exist when the VNTR
bands between suspect and crime scene visibly did not match up. Norman, 246 Science
1556 (cited in note 60). See also Ex parte Perry, 586 So2d 242, 251 (Ala 1991).
s, Andrews v State, 533 So2d 841 (Fla Dist Ct App 1988).
Castro, 545 NYS2d at 985.
9' Ex parte Perry, 586 So2d 242 (Ala 1991).
' State v Woodall, 182 W Va 15, 385 SE2d.253 (WV 1989).
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Bulls. 5 In contrast, the probabilistic component of DNA profil-
ing has been found inadmissible both before the NRC report
(Schwartz," Cumin7, Pennell98 ) and after (Cauthron,99 Peo-
ple v Pizarro,0 0  Porter,"' Rivera v State of Wyoming, 2
Vandebogart°3 ) because the theory was either not generally ac-
cepted or not reliable.
The continued departure from unquestioned acceptance of
the probabilistic evidence results, in part, from the NRC report
which was issued in April 1992. This in turn was influenced by
the now-famous December 20, 1991 issue of Science, which fea-
tured a debate between proponents and critics of the then-used
probabilistic evidence. The tenor of the articles in Science in turn
derived from the January 1991 decision in United States v Yee,
which involved a full-fledged battle of the experts.
The debate is far from over,' but there is little doubt that
DNA profiling evidence will be found admissible and that the
finally agreed-upon reliability will be high. This is the correct
result. The test is accurate and it is far superior to other methods
of individuation. In the future, improvements in the profiling
methodology may render the probabilistic debate entirely aca-
demic.
The important message of the DNA profiling debate is not
about DNA profiling itself, but rather about the relationship
between science and law. Frye places scientists and judges in
their proper fields of expertise: scientists make the arguments
about the technique and judges determine if criticisms have been
met. During the DNA profiling debate, the scientific community
considered testability, peer review or publication, error rate, and
standards controlling the technique's operations before embracing
DNA profiling, or at least matching evidence, in the NRC report.
Under Daubert, this debate would be compressed into the period
United States v Two Bulls, 918 F2d 56 (8th Cir 1990).
9 State v Schwartz, 447 NW2d 422 (Minn 1989).
Commonwealth v Cumin, 409 Mass 218, 565 NE2d 440 (Mass 1991).
State v Pennell, 584 A2d 513 (Del Super Ct 1989).
9 State v Cauthron, 120 Wash 2d 879, 846 P2d 502 (Wash 1993).
'® People v Pizarro, 10 Cal App 4th 57, 12 Cal Rptr 436 (1992).
101 United States v Porter, 618 A2d 629 (DC 1992).
102 Rivera v State of Wyoming, 840 P2d 933 (Wy 1992). Although the use of probabili-
ties was held to be harmless error as to the defendant Rivera, the court noted: "We,
therefore, believe the better practice in Wyoming should be to not refer to the statistical
probability of duplication when introducing DNA test results."
10 State v Vandebogart, 136 NH 365, 616 A2d 483 (NH 1992).
' Devlin, Risch, and Roeder, 259 Science at 748 (cited in note 19).
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of a trial, and, in the end, it would be the trial judge, and not the
relevant scientific community itself, who decides whether the
technique is "scientifically valid."' It is reasonable to question
the competence of the trial judge to make such a multi-pronged
determination. In fact, the Chief Justice highlighted the difficulty
of this inquiry in his dissent in Daubert.0 ° Under Frye, though,
if the scientific analysis is prepackaged, as in the case of the
NRC report, the task of the judge is easy. However, even if it is
not, the judges should be able to identify the common core of
agreement in the scientific community, and the points of depar-
ture.
In the debate over DNA profiling, there were at least two
key cases, Yee and Castro, which illustrate why a Frye type of
analysis is superior to a Federal Rules of Evidence analysis for
admissibility, and where Frye itself can be improved. Following a
discussion of these cases, I will analyze specific criticisms which
have been directed at the Frye standard.
A. United States v Yee
Yee was an appeal of a magistrate's decision to admit DNA
profiling evidence. Nominally, the decision in Yee is based upon a
Frye analysis, as modified by the Sixth Circuit decision of United
States v Green.'0' The defendant raised three issues on appeal
to the District Court:
1. The meaning of general acceptance in Frye,
2. The meaning of reliability,
3. The final prong of the Green test, which relates to Federal
Rule of Evidence 403.
The third issue was considered to be premature.' 8
The issue of reliability arose because of the Sixth Circuit
decision in United States v Franks which appeared to equate
general acceptance in the scientific community with a showing
that the specific principles and procedures on which expert tes-
timony is based are reliable and sufficiently accurate.0 9 The
"o Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2796.
Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2800 (Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107 United States v Green, 548 F2d 1261 (6th Cir 1977).
10" Yee, 134 FRD at 213 (Magistrate's Report and Recommendation accepted by the
Court).
"09 Id at 167 (citing United States v Franks, 511 F2d 25, 33 n 12 (6th Cir 1975).
Reliability is intertwined with general acceptance in the Kelly/Frye standard. Pizarro, 10
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court indicated that the two standards were different:
If in making its determination about the level of accep-
tance... [if] a court ventures into adjudicating the merits of
any underlying scientific disputes, it necessarily will be
required to reach conclusions about the validity of the scien-
tific principles and reliability of the procedures and results.
At that point, [the standard that evolved for determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence] would improperly
become converted into a hearing whose outcome is depen-
dent on the court's determination of the validity and reliabil-
ity of the scientific method employed by the proponent. The
effect of adjudication of the merits of the scientific dispute,
is, therefore, unavoidably to abrogate the.., standard and
substitute in its place [a] reliability standard."'
The Yee court noted that the key issue was the opinion of the
scientific community as to the acceptability of the explanatory
theory, not the opinion of the court as to the theory's reliabili-
ty."' In assessing the "scientific validity" intrinsic within the
notion of "evidentiary reliability,"" this of course is the crux of
the distinction between Frye and Federal Rules based standards.
As to the general acceptance issue, the magistrate had dofie
an excellent job of gathering all of the experts in the DNA profil-
ing area. The problem was what to do in a situation in which
credible proponents disagree with credible critics. The Yee court
rejected the counting of scientific noses,"' as other courts have
also rejected consensus approaches to satisfy general accep-
tance." '4 For the Yee court, the crucial consideration in favor of
admissibility under general acceptance was that experts other
than performers of the test (here, the FBI) had testified in favor
of the test."' Of one of these experts, the Yee court noted:
Cal App 4th at 76-77, 88; Barney, 8 Cal App 4th at 810.
"o Id at 197, as quoted in Note, DNA Profiling Evidence: the Need for a Uniform and
Workable Evidentiary Standard of Admissibility, 26 Val U L Rev 595, 628 (1992).
... Yee, 134 FRD at 167.
m Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2795 n 9.
1 Yee, 134 FRD at 165.
1 State v Pennington, 327 NC 89, 393 SE2d 847, 853 (NC 1990) (The court focussed
on reliability of the scientific method rather than its popularity within the scientific communi-
ty); Caldwell v State, 260 Ga 278, 393 SE2d 436 (Ga 1990). For an account of a situation
in which scientific consensus was wrong for 64 years, see J.M. McBride, Hexaphenylethane
Riddle, 30 Tetrahedron 2009 (1974).
115 Yee, 134 FRD at 165.
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Dr. Caskey no doubt hopes that the ruling in this case
will favor the FBI, as it will provide a judicial imprimatur to
his own program. But from his perspective, the legal contest
is less important, in terms not only of his professional stand-
ing, but, as well, for the long-term welfare of his forensic
laboratory. Regardless of how his views are received in this
or any other court, it is clear that Dr. Caskey has more to
lose if his decisions are judged to have been erroneous from
a scientific perspective, and if his confidence in the quality of
the procedures is proven to have been mistaken. To some
extent, therefore, Dr. Caskey has staked his professional
reputation on the accuracy of his judgment regarding the
scientific quality of the FBI's procedures." 6
In short, the court looked to the reputational stake of the
proponent's experts instead of trying to determine a common
ground among all the scientists."7
Once the Yee court utilized reputational stake of individuals
as a proxy for general acceptance, it had departed completely
from Frye. Although Yee was correct to reject judicial determina-
tion of reliability, it should not have substituted scientific self-
interest for a scientific determination of validity. First,
reputational stake has nothing to do with scientific validity. It
will motivate a proponent of disreputable science as much as it
will motivate a seeker of truth. Second, how one person is per-
ceived in the scientific community is distinct from how a scientif-
ic theory is perceived in the community. While there may be a
correlation in the acceptance of theories with the acceptance of
individual scientists, few scientists have in-depth, critical knowl-
edge of theories outside of their own narrow specialization. If
they hear of a controversy in the field of DNA profiling, most
scientists will not be quick to judge rightness or wrongness, and
they will be even less predisposed to heap scorn on the individual
scientist. The responses of scientists to the controversy of the
December 20, 1991 issue of Science are typical: scientists were
quick to see the point of view of each side."' Thus, reputational
1.6 Id at 203 (Court adopts Magistrate's Report and Recommendation).
" Furthermore, the reputational stake argument would seem to favor the critics, not
the proponents. Unlike the proponents, the critics had absolutely nothing to gain, but still
had the same downside risk if proven wrong.
... Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting, 254 Science 1721 (1991):
"They are all smart people,' says James Crow, a human geneticist at the University of
Wisconsin. To Crow and others, like Francisco Ayala, a population geneticist at the
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stake, especially among established scientists, is not a proxy for
general acceptance. Under Frye, general acceptance is in fact
itself a proxy for both reliability and validity of the theory and
method.
In Yee, the expert critics of the probability component of
DNA profiling raised important issues. The Yee court simply ig-
nored them. The proper response under Frye would have been to
establish common ground, to determine that which is generally
accepted among the experts. Extensions from that common
ground could have been made if objectively justifiable. For in-
stance, if the proponents could have made a numerical case that
conservatism about VNTR probabilities always would compensate
for uncertainties about linkage equilibrium, the result might
have been more palatable. In effect, the Yee court ignored the
arguments of the critics."'
In contrast,' the National Academy of Sciences indeed
sought and achieved a compromise in the NRC report that repre-
sented the common ground among the scientists. This approach
should be a model for the general acceptance standard of Frye.
General acceptance does not involve a counting of scientific nos-
es. Rather, it represents the delineation of a defensible scientific
position. The position is not fixed in time; further experiments
can enlarge, or shrink, the common ground. But the burden must
University of California, Irvine, the debate is not about right and wrong but about differ-
ent standards of proof, with the purists on one side demanding scientific accuracy and the
technologists on the other side saying approximations are good enough."
1 Yee, 134 FRD at 183 (Court adopts Magistrate's Report and Recommendation). De-
fense expert Eric Lander. "It is a good idea to be conservative about those individual fre-
quencies, and I support the fact that the FBI intends to be conservative about the individ-
ual frequencies, but they are apples and oranges. One pertains to whether there's a
correlation. The other pertains to your estimate of individual facts, and you can't, you
know, penalize yourself on A" to make up for a problem on "B"; it's apples and orang-
es.... [The court paraphrased Lander:] Being cautious and careful in the use of the bin
approach may have referred to calculating a frequency given a database by adding up ev-
erything within it but not to serve as a finesse to a different question. Thus, even though
the end result might be right, that would not make the method by which that result was
attained scientifically acceptable: the fact that.., it might turn out to be right doesn't
mean that it's got valid scientific method underlying it." Id.
" Although I do not think that Yee properly applied the Frye general acceptance
standard, the mere fact that Yee used a Frye standard yielded a significantly different
result than would have been obtained under Federal Rules. The scientists involved in Yee
understood how Frye worked, and proceeded to publish in refereed scientific journals. This
promoted discussion, and facilitated the generation of some legal changes. In a world
based on the Federal Rules, there is no incentive for such analysis in the case of a tech-
nique such as DNA profiling, for which there is no doubt of probative value and little
doubt of legal reliability.
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on the proponent to prove to his peers that he can do what he
claims.
B. People v Castro
The problem in People v Castro"' was not with the theory
or technique of DNA profiling. The individual testing laboratory
was sloppy in executing the technique. The Castro court added a
third part to the admissibility inquiry to deal with this laboratory
error. The third part requires asking whether the testing labora-
tory performed the accepted scientific technique. This ex post
inquiry into what a testing lab did in the specific case should not
be a question of admissibility. Acceptance of actual results in
specific cases is an issue of weight, not admissibility.'22
To remain consistent with Frye, the more appropriate third
part is whether the methods actually employed are routinely
capable of giving the result of the generally accepted tech-
nique.123 The traditional second part of Frye asks merely wheth-
er there are techniques that currently exist that are capable of
producing reliable results; it does not ask whether a given lab-
oratory is capable of performing them.
The proposed third part is simply an ex ante inquiry into
whether a given testing lab uses a specific procedure which com-
plies with the generally accepted theory and technique. It is an
appropriate Frye inquiry. Just because a generally accepted theo-
ry and technique exist does not imply that any testing lab is
capable of competently executing the technique. If there is no
demonstration of proficiency, admissibility should be denied.
Conversely, one does not want prolonged admissibility hearings
to accompany every DNA profiling case. Presentation of the re-
sults of mandatory proficiency testing would be sufficient to pass
this third prong.'24 If there are problems with the particular re-
12, Castro, 545 NYS2d at 985.
' This has been a point of discussion in recent DNA profiling cases in California.
Barney, 8 Cal App 4th at 823.
12 This proposed third part to Frye is consistent with the third part of Frye articulat-
ed in Kansas v Witte, 836 P2d 1110 (Kan 1992): "(3) the officer administering the test has
been trained to follow the procedures established by the scientists to test the phenome-
non ... "
124 Although this approach is not equivalent to the third prong of KellylFrye, the final
result is similar. "All that is necessary in the limited third-prong hearing is a founda-




suits in a given case, questions must go to the weight and not
admissibility.
C. A Response to the Criticisms of Frye
A recent commentator listed five criticisms of the Frye
test.' This part proposes solutions to the criticisms, so as to
make Frye a standard for novel scientific evidence at the state
court level.
1. What is general acceptance?
A generally accepted concept, at a minimum, is one which is
agreed upon by both proponents and critics. Proponents may ad-
vance beyond this common core by an experimental or theoretical
showing of accuracy in a peer-refereed journal or substantial
equivalent.' Such showing should constitute a rebuttable pre-
sumption, which may be defeated by later data directly negating
the contention of the proponent.
General acceptance is not defined with reference to scientific
consensus; it is determined by the validity of the underlying
scientific technique. Validity is determined by the ability of the
proponents to respond to the relevant questions of the critics. The
history of DNA profiling shows that these relevant questions are
identifiable.
2. What must be generally accepted?
Both theory and technique must be generally accepted. A
theory without a technique for reduction to practice would not
yield empirical results. A technique without a theory would not
have scientific validity.
The correctness of results in a particular case is an issue of
12 Comment, 79 Georgetown L J at 318-20 (cited in note 21).
1 I am in complete agreement with the Daubert court that publication should not be
a sine qua non of admissibility and that publication does not correlate with reliability.
Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2797. At a minimum, there must be sufficient articulation of a
theory and arrangement of data such that a scientist trained in the field can analyze the
theory and data for validity. Conversely, significant publication does not prove reliability,
as illustrated by the story of the hexaphenylethane in McBride, 30 Tetrahedron at 2009
(cited in note 114) and the story of buckminsterfullerene in soot in Lawrence B. Ebert,
The Interrelationship of C(60), Soot and Combustion, 31 Carbon 999 (1993).
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weight, not admissibility. As the Daubert court noted in its Rule
702 inquiry, "[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."
1 27
3. What is a particular field?
The concept of a "particular field" is self-defining. Any person
who has made an experimental or theoretical showing of rele-
vance to the theory or technique in question belongs to the "par-
ticular field". While a proponent can publish his work, in a peer-
refereed journal or substantial equivalent, to meet his burden of
demonstrating validity, such a requirement is not needed to es-
tablish "particular field." Moreover, even if the relevant field is
unclear, this does not mean that criticism from an arguably dif-
ferent field will go unheeded. If someone in the Swiss patent
office can show that DNA profiling does, or does not, work as
claimed, it simply does not matter that the person is not a bio-
chemist or a population geneticist.2 '
In the context of DNA profiling, one notes that, although this
issue was raised, it was resolved without difficulty.
4. When does the Frye test apply?
In a jurisdiction which employs Frye, the test would apply to
any scientific test previously unaccepted in that jurisdiction.
Once the jurisdiction has accepted the scientific test, there should
be little need for additional Frye hearings, unless significant new
evidence became available. Finally, as noted in Daubert, "theories
that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of
scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are
subject to judicial notice under FRE 201.""'
5. The "cultural lag" problem.
At no point in the evolution of a scientific test should a crim-
inal defendant bear the consequences of uncertainties in accuracy
of that scientific test when it is reasonably foreseeable that those
uncertainties will diminish. Although no test is 100% accurate,
127 Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2797.
"2 California courts address this, and the general acceptance issue, in seeking to
determine whether "scientists significant either in number or expertise publicly oppose (a
technique] as unreliable." People v Wallace, 14 Cal App 4th 651, 17 Cal Rptr 2d 721
(1993), quoting People v Brown, 40 Cal 3d 512, 533, 220 Cal Rptr 637 (1985).
1" Daubert, 113 S Ct at 2796.
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and there will always be false positives, error frequencies should
be set conservatively in transitional periods during which infor-
mation is incomplete.
CONCLUSION
For novel science, admissibility standards in which scientists
assess questions of scientific validity are preferable to those in
which judges perform the same task. The Frye standard is prefer-
able to various standards based on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. By incorporating the opinions of scientists, the legal sys-
tem ensures a restoring force by which judicial opinions are
pointed in the direction of the current common core of scientific
knowledge. The history of the admissibility of DNA profiling
evidence illustrates the significant role that scientists can play in
resolving issues; the most recent manifestation of this can be
seen in the use of state courts of the NRC's report on DNA Tech-
nology in Forensic Science. Although Frye includes inquiries into
the general acceptance of theory and technique, it may not ad-
dress all possible questions of reliability. However, a third prong
for admissibility of novel scientific evidence could determine
whether the methods actually employed by a testing laboratory
are routinely capable of giving the result of the generally accept-
ed technique.
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